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~I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN W. SPENCER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
L. C. CROWTHER, et al, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Case No. 8538 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was a member of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department from October, 1938, to and in-
cluding June 1, 1951 (R. 68). On the Iatter date 
he was discharged by order of the Chief of Police, 
L. C. Crowther. The reason assigned for appellant's 
removal from the police payroll was that he was 
not at that time a bona fide resident of Salt Lake 
City living with his family within the City. ( Def's. 
Exh. 11). 







Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
given notice dated April 24, 1950, that after thirty 
days from that date every officer not living within 
Salt Lake City would be suspended, (Def's. Exh. 8). 
At the time of the issuance of this notice appellant 
was residing in Salt Lake County ( R. 69). 
After receiving notice, appellant obtained a 
room within Salt Lake City at 364 East Sixth South 
( R. 7 4). Appellant subsequently maintained a room 
with his brother at the Fairmont Appartments in 
Salt Lake City (R. 75) and later maintained a room 
at the home of Mrs. Irma Finch at 823 Elm Avenue, 
Salt Lake City (R. 76). Appellant maintained a 
room at the last address until two weeks after his 
discharge ( R. 7 6) . 
It is undisputed that during the time he main-
tained these rooms his wife and son continued to 
reside at 2111 Walker's Lane in Salt Lake County 
(R. 77). After appellant's discharge he moved back 
to 2111 Walker's Lane, where he remained until 
July 1, 1952, when he moved to 2731 Fillmore 
Street, Salt Lake City, which was his address and 
residence at the time of trial (R. 78). 
Within five days of his discharge appellant 
appealed to the CiYil Service Co1nn1ission of Salt 
Lake City, and in Noven1ber of 1951 he was ad-
vised by letter from the Civil Service Commission 
that the Commission would not hear the appeal be-
cause it had no jurisdiction (Plntf's Exh. 12). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thereafter appellant filed this action, which was 
tried March 27, 1956, and he appea1s to this Court 
from the adverse judg.ment entered at the trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
r 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND 
'
·,. CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A RESI-
. DENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS 
REMOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HIS CONCLUSION OF 
LAW THAT APPELLANT WAS LAWFULLY DIS-
MISSED FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
The two points here relied upon by the appel-
lant are actually co,ncomitant parts of the error 
alleged to have been committed by the trial judge 
and will be here argued together. 
This appeal is entirely a rna tter of analyzing 
and applying statutory sections to the facts intro-
duced at the trial. Two sections of the statutes 
should be examined. The first is Sec. 10-6-6, U. C.A. 
1953, which reads as follows: 
"E1igibility of Officers: All elective offi-
cers of cities and of towns shall be chosen by 
the qualified voters of their respective muni-
cipalities. No person shall be eligible to any 
office, elective or appointive, who is not a 
qualified elector of the city or town, nor shall 
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any person be eligible to any office who is a 
defaulter to the corporation." ~ 
'The other is Sec. 20-2-13 and reads as follows: 
"A 'Resident' Defined: A resident with-
in the meaning of this title is a person who 
has resided or will have resided continuously 
within this state for one year, and in the 
county four months, and in the precinct sixty 
days, next preceding the day of the next en-
suing election.'' 
The whole question to be decided is whether 
appellant was or was not a resident of Salt Lake 
City within the meaning of these sections. 
Appellant of course contends that he was, and 
the only evidence presented leads necessarily to such 
a finding and conclusion and the trial judge was in • 
error when he found otherwise. 
Appellant's testimony shows he was living in 
Salt Lake County when advised by the Chief of 
Police that he would have to move into Salt Lake :~ 
City (R. 69). What he did then is clear. Appellant J 
made arrangements to move and establish his resi-
dence in Salt Lake City. 
Appellant consulted the corporation counsel of 
Salt Lake City about the requirements for estab-
lishing re~idence in Salt Lake City ( R. 71). He was )I 
told, and rightly so, as a result of this conversation 
that place of residence is a matter of intention and 
may be established upon that basis and without any 
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necessary reference to the time involved. It is there-
fore appellant's contention that he moved into Salt 
Lake City with the intent to establish his residence 
therein and that he did so. 
The next consideration is whether appe1lant 
complied with that provision of Sec. 10-6-6 of U.C.A. 
1953,. which required him to be a qualified elector 
of the City of Salt Lake. 
The record is clear that the appellant was regis-
tered in voting district No. 68 in Salt Lake City 
during the years 1942, 1944, 1946 and 1948 (Plntf's. 
Exh. 1, R. 75-76). Appellant changed his registra-
tion in 1950 to Salt Lake City voting District No. 
224, which includes the Fairmont Apartments where 
he was living at that time (Plntf's Exh. 1, R. 75-
7 6) . His testimony is that he voted in District No. 
224 in 1950 (R. 76). 
It seems apparent, therefore, that he was in 
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 10-6-6 
above referred to. 
It should further be noted that Chief Odes B. 
Record made an investigation to determine where 
the appellant's residence was (R. 131-132). The in-
vestigation was conducted after the discharge of the 
appellant and was cursory and incomplete. 
On cross-examination of Chief Record the fol-
lowing questions and answers about his investiga-
tion resulted (R. 132-133-134): 
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"BY MR. ALLEN: 
Q. Chief, you have testified about an 
investigation that you and Captain Haight 
made. Was all of the investigation you made 
on behalf of the Chief conducted after June 
1st, 1951? 
A, Yes, it was. 
Q. And you conducted your own inves-
tigation with respect to his residence, or where 
he was living, prior to that time? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. So to your knowledge you don't have 
information with respect to where he was liv-
ing before the Chief asked you to conduct 
that investigation? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you do anything out on Walker 
Lane except observe the mail box? 
A. We went out and checked out there 
and there was just his name on the mail box. 
We also checked the school to find out if his 
boy was going to school at the Cottonwood 
School. 
Q. At that time, did you talk with any-
body at the place on Walker Lane? 
A. No. 
Q. And you conducted no investigation 
in Salt Lake at the Fairmont Apartments? 
A. Yes. 
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A. We talked to a Mr. Smith, who I 
believe he said was the manager of the a part-
ments, and asked him about Mr. Spencer, 
John Spencer, and he said he had a Clyde 
Spencer living there and knew of no other 
Spencer living in the apartment. 
Q. You didn't ever go to Clyde Spencer's 
apartment, did you? 
A. He wasn't there when we made the 
investigation. He moved from there prior to 
that time. 
Q. Did you ever talk with Mrs. Finch 
out on Elm Avenue? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you talk with her? 
A. The same day. We made all three 
of them the same day, right after the first of 
June, the first week of June, 1951. 
Q. Did you ascertain from talking with 
her that he had been living there for some 
time? 
A. She told us he lived there and had 
a bedroom. She took us back and showed us 
the bedroom he was supposed to be renting 
from her. 
Q. Did you talk with any of the neigh-
bors out there on Elm Avenue? 
A. It seems to me like we did talk to 
some lady out watering her lawn and I think 
she said, "I don't pay any attention to my 
neighbors who come and go, 'but I don't know 
who it was but it was some lady watering 
the lawn next door east.' 
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Q. In connection with the investigation 
you were requested to make, Chief, did you 
ever talk to the Plaintiff John Spencer about 
il? ' ' 
A. I don't believe I ever did." 
It seems obvious that this investigation con-
tributed absolutely nothing as to the residence status 
of the appellant before he was discharged. 
From the foregoing the plaintiff contends that 
Finding No. 8 (R. 147) was clearly against the un-
controverted testimony that appellant was in com-
pliance with the law, was a resident of Salt Lake 
City, registered and voted. The Trial Court found 
in Finding No.8 (R. 147): 
''The court finds from the evidence pre-
sented to it at the trial of the issues involved 
herein, that plaintiff was not on May 29, 1951, 
or on June 1, 1951, nor had he been for several 
years prior thereto, and was not thereafter 
during the remainder of 1951, a qualified re-
sident and elector of Salt Lake City, but dur-
ing all of said time plaintiff was a resident 
of Salt Lake County, outside and beyond the 
limits and boundaries of Salt Lake City and 
so was ineligible to hold office as a police 
officer of Salt Lake City." 
This is in clear contradiction of appellal.L" s 
Exhibit 1 which showed appellant was a registered 
voter in 1942, 1944, 1946, 1948 and 1950 and which 
was admitted by stipulation of counsel for the res-
pondent (R. 75-76). 
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It seems equally clear that the Trial Court's 
conclusion of law No. 2 (R. 147) "that plaintiff 
was lawfully dismissed from the Police Department 
of Salt Lake City" based upon the charge that he 
was not a resident of Salt Lake City is erroneous 
and wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
The appellant therefore submits that the judg-
ment of the Trial Court should be reversed and the 
respondents and their agents be required and order-
ed to reinstate appellant to the use and enjoyment 
of his office as a police officer of Salt Lake City. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON, 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
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